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CASENOTES 
Application of the "Exculpatory No" Defense to 
Prosecutions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001: United 
States u. Fitzgibbon 
During the past thirty years, the federal judiciary has con- 
fronted a number of novel and troublesome applications of the 
federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. 8 1001.' To limit the 
scope of the statute, the Fifth Circuit originated the "exculpa- 
tory no" defense in 1962? The question has now arisen whether 
the defense should apply to protect those who give false state- 
ments to United States Customs officials. In United States v. 
S~hnaiderman,~ the Fifth Circuit held that the defense does ap- 
ply in such  situation^.^ However, the Tenth Circuit recently held 
1. 18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (1976) originated in legislation enacted over 100 years ago. Act 
of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. A number of amendments have broadened the 
original provision against false statements. For a summary of these amendments, see 
United States v. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. 857 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 
503 (1954). In 1948 the statute was amended to its present form as 18 U.S.C. $ 1001. Act 
of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683. The statute provides as follows: 
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers 
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious 
or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing 
or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent 
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both. 
Recent cases arising under this statute include those concerning persons who file false 
statements on tax returns, see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Note, 
Constitutionally Privileged False Statements, 22 STAN. L. REV. 783 (1970), and infor- 
mants who give false information to the F.B.I., see United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 
943 (5th Cir. 1974). 
2. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962). The defendant in 
Paternostro was questioned by Internal Revenue agents about a "graft money" scheme 
in the New Orleans Police Department. The defendant answered negatively when asked 
whether he knew about or had participated in the scheme. These answers were later 
found to be false. The court stated that "mere negative responses to questions pro- 
pounded . . . by an investigating agent during a question and answer conference, not 
initiated by the [defendant]" are not statements as required by 18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (1976). 
Id. a t  305. This is commonly referred to as the "exculpatory no" defense. 
3. 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978). 
4. Schnaiderman was a Venezuelan who entered the United States a t  Miami, Flor- 
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to the contrary in United States v. Fitzgibbon? 
On March 31, 1977, Kenneth C. Fitzgibbon landed in the 
United States at Denver, Colorado, on an airline flight from Ca- 
nada. Upon his arrival, Fitzgibbon returned customs form 6059- 
B to an airport customs ~fficial.~ The form requests the passen- 
ger to indicate whether he is carrying more than $5,000 in coin, 
currency, or monetary instruments. Fitzgibbon checked a "no" 
response to this question. Persons carrying more than $5,000 are 
required to report additional information about the money on a 
separate form.' During a subsequent routine inspection, a cus- 
toms official repeated the question orally and Fitzgibbon again 
answered "no." At this point the official noticed that Fitzgibbon 
was nervous and conducted a search in which more than $10,000 
was found in Fitzgibbon's boots. 
Fitzgibbon was later convicted of knowingly and willfully 
making a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 1001. The 
conviction was based solely on the false written answer that 
Fitzgibbon had given on the customs form. On appeal: Fitzgib- 
ida, on a flight from Caracas. When asked if he was carrying more than $5,000, he an- 
swered "no." He also responded "no" to the same question on customs form 6059-B. 
When Schnaiderman was searched, however, more than $8,000 was found in his pockets. 
The Fifth Circuit applied the "exculpatory no" doctrine to reverse Schnaiderman's con- 
viction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). 
5. 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980). 
6. Form 6059-B is given to all passengers entering the United States. It  is one of 
several forms used by the United States Customs Service pursuant to the Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. $8 1051-143 (1976), and regulations 
promulgated thereunder, 31 C.F.R. $8 103.11-.51 (1979). 
7. Form 4790 of the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department, entitled 
"Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments," is used 
to report sums greater than $5,000. This report is required by 31 U.S.C. 8 1101 (1976), 
which reads in pertinent part: 
[Wlhoever . . . knowingly- 
(1) transports or causes to be transported monetary instruments- 
(A) from any place within the United States to or through any 
place outside the United States, or 
(B) to any place within the United States from or through any 
place outside the United States . . . 
in an amount exceeding $5,000 on any one occasion shall file a report . . . . 
For a discussion of the contents of form 4790, see United States v. San Juan, 405 F. 
Supp. 686, 692 (D. Vt. 1975)' reu'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976). 
8. This was actually the second time the Tenth Circuit had heard an appeal of Fitz- 
gibbon's case. The first appeal, United States v. Fitzgibbon, 576 F.2d 279 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978), resulted in affirmance of the defendant's conviction. 
After being incarcerated, Fitzgibbon filed a motion pursuant to the federal habeas corpus 
statute, 28 U.S.C. $ 2255 (1976)' to vacate and set aside his sentence. The district court 
denied the motion and this second appeal followed. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 
F.2d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1980). 
6551 CASENOTES 657 
bon claimed that he had been denied the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial because his attorney had failed to raise the "ex- 
culpatory no" defense.. The Tenth Circuit thus faced for the 
first time the question of whether the "exculpatory no" defense 
should prevent a conviction under section 1001 for giving false 
negative answers to United States Customs officials. In a unani- 
mous decision the court affirmed the conviction and held that 
the defense does not apply.1° 
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of the customs situa- 
tion with an extensive review of the reasoning in Schnaiderman. 
The court delineated the five elements of a section 1001 offense 
and concluded that these elements had been established at Fitz- 
gibbon's trial." Particular emphasis was placed on the element 
of "knowledge and willfulness." The court explained that the 
"exculpatory no" defense was based on the assumption that a 
negative response, by itself, is not sufficient to establish that a 
defendant acted willfully.la In this particular case, however, 
Fitzgibbon had been notified of the currency reporting require- 
ments by large signs in the Denver airport.lS The court deter- 
mined that this additional evidence, when combined with the 
negative response, was sutticient to prove that Fitzgibbon had 
acted with the required intent.14 
After determining that the statutory elements had been 
met, the court gave two other reasons why the "exculpatory no" 
defense should not apply. First, the defense was established to 
prevent convictions for giving false answers to "investigative 
agents" of the government? According to the Tenth Circuit, the 
function of the customs officials was not investigative, but ad- 
9. The Tenth Circuit observed that the defendant's counsel had, in fact, raised the 
"exculpatory no" defense before the trial court on a motion to dismiss and in the first 
appeal. The court elected to reach the issue, however, "both because it was apparently 
not properly articulated in the prior proceedings and because it [was] an issue which 
[had] not been previously decided by this Court." 619 F.2d at 876. 
10. 619 F.2d at 880. This result was in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit's deci- 
sion in United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978). 
11. The offense requires (1) a statement, (2) that the statement be false, (3) that the 
statement be material, (4) that the statement be made in a "matter within the jurisdic- 
tion of any department or agency of the United States," and (5) that the statement be 
made knowingly and willfully. 619 F.2d at  879. 
12. Id. at 876-77. 
13. Id. at 880. 
14. Id. 
15. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 305, 309 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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ministrative.16 Second, the court saw no possibility of self-in- 
crimination-a premise of the "exculpatory no" defense-in this 
customs situation.'' 
Although the Tenth Circuit in Fitzgibbon appears to have 
arrived at a better result than the Fifth Circuit in 
Schnaiderman, the reasoning of both courts was based, at times, 
on unsound interpretations of 18 U.S.C. 5 1001.18 In Fitzgibbon, 
the court stated that "[tlhe predicate of the 'exculpatory no' de- 
fense is simply that a negative response cannot serve as proof of 
the requisite knowledge and willfulness required to convict 
under 18 U.S.C. 5 1001."19 The court thus perceived the defense 
as centering on a narrow interpretation of the requirement of 
willfulness. This perception, however, is not entirely accurate. 
The Fifth Circuit and a number of lower courts created the 
"exculpatory no" defense to limit the applicability of the false 
statements statute.'O To accomplish this end, these courts re- 
stricted the scope of the term "statement" as used in section 
1001, rather than the terms "knowing and willful."21 The courts 
16. 619 F.2d at  880-81. 
17. Id. at  881. In order for the "exculpatory no" defense to apply, the government 
inquiry must have created a potential for self-incrimination. See United States v. Bush, 
503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 
1974); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 207 (D. Md. 1955). In Fitzgibbon, the 
Tenth Circuit said that there was no potential for self-incrimination because "Fitzgibbon 
could not have been held criminally liable under the subject statute had he truthfully 
reported the . . . currency." 619 F.2d a t  881. The Fifth Circuit in Schnaiderrnan, how- 
ever, felt that there was a possibility of self-incrimination in this type of situation. 568 
F.2d a t  1213-14. Only one federal court has had occasion to decide this fifth amendment 
issue directly. United States v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686 (D. Vt. 1975), rev'd on other 
grounds, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976). In San Juan, the court held that the customs 
forms do not violate the fifth amendment. Id. at  694-95. 
18. The only factual difference between the two cases is that Fitzgibbon was charged 
for having given a false written statement, whereas Schnaiderman was charged for hav- 
ing given a false oral statement. The distinction between oral and written statements, 
however, has been held to be insignificant. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 
43, 46 (1952). 
19. 619 F.2d at 876. 
20. See United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying a lim- 
ited view of the term "statement"); United States v. Moore, 185 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 
1950) (calling for strict construction of 1 1001); United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (holding negative responses incapable of perverting a governmental 
function); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955) (applying a limited 
view of the term "statement"); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953) 
(calling for strict construction of 1 1001 to preserve the validity of perjury statutes). 
21. See United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. 
Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. 
Md. 1955). 
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interpreted the term "statement" to require an affirmative and 
voluntary expression or action on the part of the defendant-an 
expression or action capable of perverting some governmental 
function." Under this view, mere passive, false responses to gov- 
ernmental inquiries do not constitute "statements" within the 
meaning of section 1001.as The "exculpatory no" defense was 
thus predicated on a narrow view of the type of statement that 
section 1001 proscribes, not on the degree of intent with which 
the statement was uttered. 
Nevertheless, the degree of intent required by the statute 
was a controlling issue in Fitzgibbon. Both the Fifth Circuit and 
the Tenth Circuit approaches to finding willfulness require a 
showing that the defendant acted with bad intent. In both cir- 
cuits, the government is expected to provide travelers with a cer- 
tain amount of notice concerning the currency reporting require- 
ments of 31 U.S.C. § l lO1 .U Unless a defendant has received 
this notice, the courts will find him incapable of forming the in- 
tent to pervert the functions of the Customs Servi~e.'~ In 
Schnaiderman, the court held that the defendant had not re- 
ceived sufficient notice to have this level of willf~lness.~~ The 
Tenth Circuit, however, indicated that large signs in the Denver 
airport gave Fitzgibbon s d c i e n t  notice of the reporting laws to 
enable his conduct to be willful.37 
It is arguable that both courts defined willfulness too nar- 
rowly. The legislative history of section 1001 does not give any 
indication of what Congress intended the word "willful" to 
mean.'= The federal courts, however, agreed on a definition of 
22. Compare United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) with Paternostro v. 
United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) and United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 
205 (D. Md. 1955). 
23. United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206 (D. Md. 1955). 
24. In the Fifth Circuit, the government must show that the defendant not only 
knew about the reporting requirements, but that he also knew it was not a crime to 
transport more than $5,000 as long as it had been reported. United States v. 
Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978). The Tenth Circuit apparently re- 
quires only that the government notify travelers of the reporting requirements. This can 
be inferred from the court's great effort to show that Fitzgibbon had been so notified. 
619 F.2d at 880. 
25. This theory was first set forth in United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 
519 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), reu'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977). See also 
United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d a t  1213. 
26. 568 F.2d at 1213. 
27. 619 F.2d at 880. 
28. Fir a detailed discussion of the legislative history of 5 1001, see United States v. 
Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941); United States v. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. 857 (D.D.C.), 
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the term some twenty-five years ago. In 1951, the Tenth Circuit 
held it unnecessary for "the Government to prove . . . an evil 
intent" in cases under section 1001.29 The only intent required 
was an intent to utter the false statement. "Willful," the court 
stated, "means no more than that the interdicted act is done 
deliberately and with kno~ledge."~~ The Fifth Circuit in 1955 
defined "willful" in the same termsm and did not change its 'defi- 
nition until S~hnaiderman.~~ In 1969, the Supreme Court lent 
its approval to these early definitions used by the Fifth and 
Tenth Circuits." The Court spoke of willfulness in terms of 
"know[ing] the falsity of [one's] statement at the time it was 
made," and of not being the "product of an accident, honest in- 
advertence, or d ~ r e s s . " ~  
The requirement of bad intent, which was adopted in both 
Schnaiderman and Fitzgibbon, appears to be the result of an 
erroneous interpretation of United States u. Gilliland.s6 In Gil- 
liland, the Supreme Court held that a 1934 amendment to sec- 
tion 100IM was intended "to protect the authorized functions of 
governmental departments and agencies from the perversion 
which might result from the deceptive practices described [in 
the statute]."" From this statement the Fifth Circuit errone- 
ously concluded that section 1001 requires an "intent to pervert 
the purpose of' the customs regulations." The Tenth Circuit re- 
quired a similar finding of intent.s9 The Supreme Court's state- 
ment in GiNiland, however, does not require a finding of intent 
- -- - - 
rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 503 (1954). 
29. Walker v. United States, 192 F.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir. 1951). 
30. Id. 
31. McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 253-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
934 (1955). 
32. See generally United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. Parten, 462 F.2d 430, 432-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 
(1972). Both of these Fifth Circuit cases retained the original definition of "willfulness" 
as merely being "deliberate." 
33. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1969). 
34. Id. 
35. 312 U.S. 86 (1941). 
36. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996. The amendment eliminated a re- 
quirement that a defendant's false statement must have resulted in pecuniary or prop- 
erty loss to the government. For a detailed discussion of this amendment, see United 
States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941). 
37. 312 U.S. at  93. 
38. See United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978). 
39. The court emphasized that Fitzgibbon's false statement was "designed to con- 
ceal information relevant to the administrative process." 619 F.2d at 880. In other words, 
Fitzgibbon intended to pervert the function of the customs agent. 
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to pervert the functions of government. It merely states that 
perversion of governmental functions is the likely result of false 
statements and that the amendment was intended to prevent 
such perversion by punishing those who utter false statements. 
Thus, the proper interpretation of the term "willful" as 
used in section 1001 is not nearly as restrictive as the courts in 
Fitzgibbon and Schnaiderman believed. There is no require- 
ment of bad intent-an intent to pervert a governmental func- 
tion. All that is required is that the defendant intend to make 
the statement and that the defendant know that his statement is 
false when he makes it. Under this standard, both Fitzgibbon 
and Schnaiderman clearly acted knowingly and willfully within 
the meaning of section 1001. 
Another reason for the Tenth Circuit's refusal to apply the 
"exculpatory no" defense was its belief that the customs agents 
were not performing an "investigative" function.'O United 
States v. Paterno~tro,'~ which established the defense, restricted 
its use to cases in which an "investigating agent'' propounded 
questions to the defendant." Under the Paternostro test, this 
issue is determined by whether the government official is "per- 
forming essentially the [investigative] functions of a 'police- 
man., "49 This would include investigating possible criminal ac- 
tivity. But there is no clear answer as to how customs agents 
should be classified under the Paternostro test." 
Debate over the correct classification, however, is unneces- 
sary. The distinction between investigative and administrative 
agents arose from a narrow interpretation of the term "jurisdic- 
40. 619 F.2d at 880-81. 
41. 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962). 
42. Id. at  305, 309. 
43. Id. at 309. 
44. Certain factora support and others refute the classification of customs officials as 
"investigative agents." The express purpose of the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. 85 1051-143 (1976), is "to require certain reports . . . where 
such reporta . . . have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investi- 
gations or proceedings." Id. 1051. One federal district court has said that the Act is 
more criminal than regulatory. United Statea v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686,693 (D. Vt. 
1975), reu'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976). Furthermore, the Act pro- 
vides criminal as well as civil sanctions for its violation. 31 U.S.C. § 1058 (1976). 
It has also been argued, however, that the distribution of form 6059-B is strictly 
administrative in nature. 619 F.2d a t  880-81. The form is not required by the Act but is 
merely an administrative tool used to help customs officials determine which travelers 
need to file a report. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. "There [is] no indication 
of criminal investigation or police coercion" surrounding completion of the form by a 
traveler. 619 F.2d at 880. 
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tion" as used in 18 U.S.C. 8 1001. In United States u. Dauey," a 
federal district court held that the investigative function of the 
F.B.I. was not a "matter within the jurisdiction of a department 
or agency of the United States." After Dauey, other courts began 
to distinguish between investigative and administrative func- 
tions. Paternostro made the distinction a part of the "exculpa- 
tory no" defense in 1962:. and the Eighth Circuit followed suit 
in 1967." In 1969, however, the Supreme Court dealt what 
should have been a deathblow to tbis distinction. In Bryson v. 
United  state^,'^ the Court stated: 
Because there is a valid legislative interest in protecting the 
integrity of official inquiries, . . . we think the term "jurisdic- 
tion" should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for 
purposes of 5 1001 . . . . A statutory basis for an agency's re- 
quest for information provides jurisdiction enough to punish 
fraudulent statements under $ lOOl.'@ 
The Court cited with approval a case from the Second Circuit 
that severely criticized the classification of governmental func- 
tions as being either administrative or investigati~e.~~ 
Accordingly, the debate over whether customs officials 
should be classified as investigative or administrative agents is 
futile. The distinction, based on a narrow reading of "jurisdic- 
tion" under section 1001, has been expressly condemned." The 
information that customs officials request concerning currency 
has the statutory basis required by Bryson, and that statutory 
basis has been held constitutional." Whether the agent's func- 
tion is administrative or investigative is irrelevant. The critical 
question is whether a defendant's false statements are capable of 
perverting a government agent's function. 
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit agree that a 
customs agent's function with respect to the currency reporting 
45. 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
46. 311 F.2d at 305, 309. 
47. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967). 
48. 396 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1969). 
49. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). 
50. See United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917,921-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
1006 (1967), cited with approval in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. at 70-71 (1969). 
51. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1969). 
52. In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Supreme Court 
upheld the statutory basis underlying the currency reporting requirements. See also 
United States v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686 (D. Vt. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 545 
F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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requirement is to ensure that the transportation of more than 
$5,000 into the United States is reported? A negative answer on 
form 6059-B is capable of obstructing the agent's function. The 
question on form 6059-B is the agent's primary tool to prevent 
currency in excess of $5,000 from going unreported. Unless there 
is some other overt indication that a traveler is lying, a false 
negative response will result in frustration of the agent's 
function. 
Although the Fifth and Tenth Circuits arrived at opposite 
conclusions in Schnaiderman and Fitzgibbon, their reasoning 
was based on the same erroneous premises. Both courts applied 
too strict a definition of willfulness, and both courts relied on a 
classification of governmental functions that has been invali- 
dated by the Supreme Court. In each case, these issues should 
have been resolved against the defendants. Thus, although based 
on unsound reasoning, the Tenth Circuit's conviction of Fitzgib- 
bon was a correct result. 
James M. Dester 
53. See United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980). 
